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1 Introduction
Merger policy can alter rmsincentives to enter a given market. More precisely, a more lenient
merger policy can lead to less product-market competition, thus making entry more attractive.1
This dynamic e¤ect may benet consumers but should be weighted against the adverse static
e¤ect of a reduction in competition on consumer surplus. In this note, we study the optimal
merger policy of a competition authority facing this trade-o¤, focusing in particular on the
circumstances under which the authority should be lenient towards merging parties.
We build a simple model where a rm must decide whether to enter a market in which
an incumbent operates. Entry is costly and post-entry prots depend both on the number
of independent rms in the industry and on stochastic market conditions captured by the
existence of two states of the world. A key player in our model is a competition authority
who can commit ex ante to its future behavior towards merger proposals, modelled here as
the probability of clearing a merger in each state of the world. The merger policy adopted by
the competition authority a¤ects the potential entrants expected prot through its e¤ect on
market structure.
We derive the optimal merger policy focusing on mergers that are ex post anticompetitive,
i.e. that reduce ex post consumer surplus.2 We nd that the competition authority should be
lenient in priority in the state of the world where the ratio between the loss in ex post consumer
surplus and the gain in the entrants expected prot induced by the merger is the lowest. The
optimal merger policy is shown to be driven by this ratio both when the competition authority
knows the entry cost and when it only knows its distribution.
We then apply this general result to a scenario in which uncertainty is about the entrants
marginal cost of production. We rst assume that the entrant has the same production cost
as the incumbent in one state of the world, while it is less e¢ cient in the other state of the
world. When the entrant faces such a "downside" risk, we show that the optimal merger
policy should be more lenient in the state of the world which is unfavorable to the entrant.
This nding is somewhat reminiscent of the failing rm defense, where a rm on the eve of
bankruptcy is allowed to merge.3 However, this result does not always hold: the competition
authority may nd it optimal to be more lenient in the state of the world where the entrant
is the most successful. More specically, if there is an "upside" risk for the entrant, who can
1Note that an entrant may benet from a higher probability that a future merger is cleared both when it is
one of the merging parties and when it is an outsider. In both cases, the increase in the entrants prot results
from a decrease in the intensity of product-market competition.
2 In the case of an ex post procompetitive merger, the competition policy faces no trade-o¤: a more lenient
merger policy increases ex post consumer surplus and makes entry more attractive (which increases ex ante
consumer surplus).
3Note that the failing rm defense is used to justify the clearance of a merger involving a failing rm on
the grounds of the ex post e¤ects of that merger. In contrast, our nding (in the case of an entrant facing a
downside risk) justies a more lenient treatment of a merger involving an unsuccessful entrant based on the ex
ante e¤ect of merger policy on entry.
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be either as e¢ cient as or more e¢ cient than the incumbent, the competition authority shoud
let the merger happen in priority when the entrant turns out to be more e¢ cient than the
incumbent. Both results follow from the fact that the ex post behavior of the merged entity
is less harmful when the merging parties are asymmetric (in terms of e¢ ciency). In that case,
the standard negative e¤ect of reducing the number of rms in the market is partially o¤set
by the withdrawal of the less e¢ cient production units.
The early literature on mergers (e.g., Salant et al., 1983, Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, McAfee
and Wiliams, 1992) has focused on the static e¤ects of mergers on prots and welfare. More
recently, the e¤ects of mergers have been investigated in dynamic settings allowing for the entry
of new rms and/or accounting for the reaction of competition authorities. Gowrisankaran
(1999) was the rst to propose a fully dynamic model of mergers, with entry, endogenous
mergers and production at each period. He showed both the need for a dynamic merger
analysis and the complexity of such analysis.4 Relatedly, Nocke and Whinston (2010) derived
conditions under which a simple static, i.e. myopic, merger policy could be optimal even in a
dynamic framework.
Our approach is simpler in that it assumes the merger to be always benecial for the merging
rms and, therefore, always implemented if the competition authority does not block it. We
rather focus on the interaction between merger policy and entry decisions when the competition
authority can commit ex ante to its policy. In this respect, the closest paper to ours is Mason
and Weeds (2013) who also study the impact of merger policy on entry and derive the optimal
merger policy. In their setting, the merger policy amounts to choosing a threshold for the
entrants prot below which a merger is allowed. In that sense, their approach is built on the
failing (or "ailing") rm defense story. In contrast, we consider a setting where the merger
policy choice is less restricted: we do not require the competition authority to be more lenient
in the state of the world which is the least favorable to the entrant. We actually show that the
competition authority may nd it optimal to be more lenient towards a successful, rather than
an unsuccessful, entrant. Our note is therefore complementary to Mason and Weeds (2013),
as it provides new insights on how to design merger policy when the e¤ect of such policy on
entry is taken into account.
2 Model
We consider a setting in which an incumbent, rm I, operates in a market, and a rm E
considers the possibility of entering this market. To enter the market, rm E must pay a xed
cost F  0. Prots and consumer surplus are a¤ected by two factors: the number of rms in
the industry and the realization of a random variable capturing uncertain market conditions
4Extending this approach, Igami and Uetake (2016) develop a dynamic game with endogenous mergers,
innovation and entry-exit at each period. They nd that mergers are a dominant mode of exit and sometimes
generate productivity improvements.
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(i.e. demand and/or cost conditions). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are two
states of the world, i = 1; 2, and denote by  the (exogenous) probability that state 1 occurs.
In the state of the world i = 1; 2, consumer surplus is denoted CSmi when rm E does
not enter the market, CSCi when rm E enters the market and competes with the incumbent,
and CSMi when rm E enters the market and merges with the incumbent (where m stands for
monopoly, C for competition, and M for merger). We focus on the scenario in which a merger
between the entrant and the incumbent is anticompetitive ex post : consumer surplus under
entry and competition is larger than consumer surplus when entry occurs and is followed by a
merger, i.e. CSCi > CS
M
i . We also make the natural assumption that entry benets consumers
even when it is followed by a merger, i.e. CSMi  CSmi . These two assumptions ensure that
we are in the interesting scenario in which there is a tension between the ex ante and ex post
e¤ects of merger policy on consumers.
Similarly, for each state of the world i = 1; 2, we denote by ki and ^
k
i the entrants and the
incumbents prots respectively, where k = m if rm E does not enter the market (with the
convention that mi = 0), k = C if it enters the market and competes with the incumbent, and
k = M if it enters the market and merges with the incumbent. Without loss of generality, we
assume that C1  C2 so that state 2 is (weakly) more favorable than state 1 for the potential
entrant under competition. Finally, we suppose that a merger between the entrant and the
incumbent leads to an increase in the prots of both parties in both states of the world, i.e.
Mi > 
C
i and ^
M
i > ^
C
i , for i = 1; 2. This implies that the entrant and the incumbent always
want to merge in our setting.
We assume that the entrant and the incumbent need to notify their merger to a competition
authority who decides whether to clear or block the merger. We dene a merger policy as a
commitment made ex ante, i.e. before the realization of the state of the world, about the
decision to clear or block the merger. Formally, we assume that the competition authority
commits to a probability i 2 [0; 1] of clearing the merger in each state i = 1; 2. Finally, we
suppose that the authority maximizes consumer surplus.5
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The competition authority decides and publicly announces its merger policy (1; 2) 2
[0; 1] :2
2. Firm E decides whether to enter the market or not. If it does, it incurs the xed cost F .
3. The state of the world is observed by all parties.6
5Assuming that the competition authority maximizes total welfare would not alter qualitatively our results
as long as we adapt our assumptions to ensure that we are in the interesting scenario in which entry is desirable
from a total welfare perspective and the merger between the entrant and the incumbent leads to a decrease in
total welfare ex post.
6To justify this observability, we can include a pre-merger competition phase as in Mason ad Weeds (2013).
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4. If rm E entered in stage 2, the two rms notify their merger to the competition authority
who clears it with probability i in state i.
5. The payo¤s are realized.
Let us consider rst rm Es decision to enter the market. Firm E enters if and only if
F   (1  1)C1 + 1M1 + (1  ) (1  2)C2 + 2M2   ~F (1; 2):
Using the fact that ~F (1; 2) is strictly increasing in (1; 2) (because 
M
i > 
C
i ), we can make
the following two statements:
1. If F > ~F (1; 1), then rm E will never enter the market regardless of the competition
authoritys merger policy.
2. If F  ~F (0; 0), then rm E will enter the market regardless of the competition authoritys
merger policy.
In the rst case, merger policy is irrelevant since there is never entry. In the second case,
merger policy only a¤ects the ex post expected consumer surplus:


(1  1)CSC1 + 1CSM1

+ (1  ) (1  2)CSC2 + 1CSM2 
Since the latter is decreasing in 1 and 2 (because CS
C
i > CS
M
i ), the optimal merger policy is
given by (1; 2) = (0; 0) when F  ~F (0; 0). In other words, the competition authority always
blocks the merger in this case.
We now focus on the intermediate (and most interesting) case where F 2 ( ~F (0; 0); ~F (1; 1)].
Since entry is always benecial to consumers, the competition authoritys maximization pro-
gram can be written as
max
(1;2)2[0;1]2


(1  1)CSC1 + 1CSM1

+ (1  ) (1  2)CSC2 + 2CSM2  ;
s.t. ~F (1; 2)  F: (1)
Since the authoritys objective function is decreasing in 1 and 2 while the LHS of the entry
condition (1) increases in 1 and 2, the latter is necessarily binding at the optimum. The
following proposition provides the optimal merger policy.
While this would make our model more realistic, it would not a¤ect our results and main message because this
additional phase would not be a¤ected by the merger policy.
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Proposition 1 Assume that F 2 ( ~F (0; 0); ~F (1; 1)] and denote i  Mi   Ci and CSi 
CSCi   CSMi . Then the optimal merger policy (1; 2) is as follows:
1. If CS1=1 < CS2=2, then
(1; 

2) =
8<:

F  ~F (0;0)
1
; 0

if ~F (0; 0) < F < ~F (0; 0) + 1
1; 1  ~F (1;1) F(1 )2

if ~F (0; 0) + 1  F < ~F (1; 1)
:
2. If CS1=1 > CS2=2, then
(1; 

2) =
8<:

0; F 
~F (0;0)
(1 )2

if ~F (0; 0) < F < ~F (0; 0) + (1  )2
1  ~F (1;1) F1 ; 1

if ~F (0; 0) + (1  )2  F < ~F (1; 1)
:
3. If CS1=1 = CS2=2, then the optimal merger policies (1; 2) are the solutions
to the equation ~F (1; 2) = F .
Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal merger policy is the outcome of a cost/benet analysis of rent shifting in both
states of the world. An increase in the probability that the merger is cleared in either state leads
to both an increase in the potential entrants ex ante expected prot and a decrease in ex post
consumer surplus. In the special case where the ratio of the loss in consumer surplus over the
gain in the entrants prot is the same in both states of the world (scenario 3), the instruments
1 and 2 are perfect substitutes from the competition authoritys perspective: a given marginal
increase in the entrants prot requires the same marginal loss in ex post consumer surplus in
both states of the world. Therefore, in this scenario, any combination (1; 2) that makes the
entrant just break even is optimal. However, when the relevant ratio is not the same in both
states of the world (scenarios 1 and 2), the instruments 1 and 2 become imperfect substitutes.
In that case, the competition authority should favor the instrument associated with the lowest
ratio, and use the other instrument only if it is necessary to induce entry. For instance, if the
ratio is lower in state 1 (scenario 1), then the competition authority should be lenient in state
1 (i.e. should set 1 > 0) in priority, and should be lenient in state 2 (i.e. should set 2 > 0)
only if committing to clear the merger for sure in state 1 (i.e. setting 1 = 1) is not su¢ cient
to provide rm E with enough incentives to enter the market.
3 Extension : Asymmetric information
In our baseline model we assume that the competition authority has the same information as
the potential entrant. In particular, we suppose that the competition authority knows the entry
cost F , which allows it to make its merger policy dependent on that cost. In this extension,
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we assume instead that it only knows the distribution of F , and show that our main nding
is robust to this change: the rule governing the choice of the state of the world in which the
competition authority should be more lenient still applies.
Denoting G(:) the c.d.f. of the entry cost F , merger policy a¤ects the expected consumer
surplus through the probability G( ~F (1; 2)) that entry occurs and through its e¤ect on ex post
consumer surplus when entry occurs. More precisely, the expected consumer surplus is given
by
ECS(1; 2) = G( ~F (1; 2))



(1  1)CSC1 + 1CSM1

+ (1  ) (1  2)CSC2 + 1CSM2 
+

1 G( ~F (1; 2))

[CSm1 + (1  )CSm2 ]
= G( ~F (1; 2)


 
CSC1   1CS1   CSm1

+ (1  )  CSC2   2CS2   CSm2 
+CSm1 + (1  )CSm2 :
The competition authority seeks to maximize ECS(1; 2) which we assume to be globally
concave in (1; 2). The next proposition shows that the ratio of the e¤ect of the merger on
ex post consumer surplus over its e¤ect on the entrants prot is still a su¢ cient statistic to
determine the state of the world in which the competition authority should be more lenient.7
Proposition 2 Assume that the competition authority only knows the distribution of the entry
cost. Then the optimal merger policy is such that:
1. If CS1=1 < CS2=2 then 1  2 and 1 = 1 whenever 2 > 0:
2. If CS1=1 > CS2=2 then 1  2 and 2 = 1 whenever 1 > 0:
3. If CS1=1 = CS2=2 then there are multiple optimal pairs (1; 2) and one of
them is such that 1 = 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the one when the entry cost is observable to
the competition authority: the latter has two instruments to provide (additional) incentives to
enter the market and should use the instrument that induces the lowest loss in ex post consumer
surplus for a given increase in post-entry prots.
7Note that this result applies not only to the case where the competition authority does not know the entry
cost but also to the scenario in which the competition authority knows the entry cost but cannot make the
merger policy depend on it.
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4 Application: Uncertainty about the entrants production cost
We now apply our main result to a scenario in which the demand and the incumbents cost
of production are deterministic but the entrants cost of production is uncertain. We conduct
our analysis with a general reduced-form model of competition and rely on the special case of
Cournot competition with linear demand to provide clear-cut ndings when the general model
o¤ers ambiguous results.
Denote C (x; y) the (equilibrium) duopoly prot of a rm producing at marginal cost x
and facing a rival producing at marginal cost y, and m (x) the monopoly prot of a rm
producing at marginal cost x. Further, denote CSC(x; y) = CSC(y; x) the consumer surplus
(in equilibrium) when the industry is duopolistic with one rm producing at marginal cost x
and the other producing at marginal cost y, and CSm(x) consumer surplus when the industry
is monopolistic and the marginal cost of production is x.
Let us make the following natural assumptions on the equilibrium prots and consumer
surplus:
A1 C (x; y) is (weakly) decreasing in x and and (weakly) increasing in y.
A2 C (x; y) + C (y; x) < m (min(x; y)) whenever min(C (x; y) ; C (y; x)) > 0
A3 CSC(x; y) is (weakly) decreasing in both x and y.
A4 CSC(x; y)  CSm (min (x; y)) :
Denote ci (resp. c^i) the entrants (resp. incumbents) marginal cost in state i = 1; 2. Assume
that, in both states of the world, both rms are active if they compete. Moreover, suppose that
the merged entitys marginal cost of production is given by min(ci; c^i). Finally, denote 
the share of the joint prot gain from the merger m (min(ci; c^i))  
 
C (ci; c^i) + 
C (c^i; ci)

captured by the entrant (which we assume to be the same in the two states of the world). With
these notations and assumptions we have:
CSi
i
=
CSC(ci; c^i)  CSm (min (ci; c^i))
 [m (min(ci; c^i))  (C (ci; c^i) + C (c^i; ci))]
The existence of potential productive e¢ ciency gains (because of the potential asymmetry
between the incumbent and the entrant) makes it possible that a merger in state i generates
both less consumer surplus loss and more prots for the industry than a merger in state j 6= i,
i.e. CSi < CSj and i > j . In that case we have unambiguously
CSi
i
<
CSj
j
which implies that the competition authority should be more lenient in state i. This preliminary
remark is useful for the analysis of the two scenarios that we consider next. In the rst scenario
the entrant faces the risk of being less e¢ cient than the incumbent, whereas in the second it
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can be more e¢ cient than the incumbent (with some probability). One can interpret the rst
scenario as corresponding to a mature industry, in which a latecomer (the entrant) can at
best catch up with an incumbent. In contrast, the second scenario would be a best t for an
innovative industry in which newcomers can be more e¢ cient than incumbents.
Scenario 1: Insuring an unsuccessful entrant
Assume that c^1 = c^2 = c and that c1 = c > c2 = c. In this scenario, the entrant faces a
downside risk in the sense that it will be at best as e¢ cient as the incumbent. The cost-benet
ratio in the state of the world i is given by
CSi
i
=
CSC(c; ci)  CSm (c)
 [m (c)  (C (c; ci) + C (ci; c))] :
As long as the competitive industry prots are higher when the entrant is more e¢ cient (that
is, in state 2), i.e.
C (c; c) + C (c; c) < 2C (c; c) (2)
the following inequality holds
CS1
1
<
CS2
2
which implies that the competition authority should be more lenient in state 1. The gain in
productive e¢ ciency in that state makes the merger less detrimental to consumers and more
protable to the entrant. Note that condition (2) requires that product-market rivalry when
the industry is symmetric is somewhat limited.8
On the contrary, if competitive industry prots are lower when the entrant is more e¢ cient
(that is, when condition (2) does not hold), then the merger is less harmful to consumers in state
1 (because it generates productive e¢ ciency gains in that state) but it is also less protable
to the rms in that state (because the asymmetry between the rms relaxes competition).
Therefore, the comparison of the two relevant ratios is a priori ambiguous.
However, in the special case, examined in the Appendix, in which rms compete à la
Cournot and face a linear demand, we are able to compare the two cost-benet ratios both
when condition (2) holds or not. More precisely, we show that the inequality
CS1
1
<
CS2
2
always holds and, therefore, the competition authority should be more lenient in state 1.
This result could be interpreted as an ex ante variant of the failing rm defense. We show
indeed that, when the entrant faces a downside risk, competition authorities should be more
lenient with that rm when it turns out to be ine¢ cient. This implies that, in this scenario,
8 In particular, this condition would not hold under Bertrand competition with homogeneous products.
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the optimal merger policy should provide the potential entrant with some insurance against
the realization of the bad state of the world.
Scenario 2: Rewarding a successful entrant
Assume again that there is no uncertainty regarding the incumbent marginals cost, i.e.
c^1 = c^2 = c, but that c1 = c > c2 = c. In this scenario, the entrant faces an upside risk in the
sense that it will be at worst as e¢ cient as the incumbent. The cost/benet ratio in each state
of the world can be written as
CS1
1
=
CSC(c; c)  CSm (c)
 [m (c)  2C (c; c)]
and
CS2
2
=
CSC(c; c)  CSm (c)
 [m (c)  (C (c; c) + C (c; c))] :
Comparing these two ratios in our general setting is di¢ cult. However, intuition suggests
that CS2=2 should be smaller than CS1=1 because the productive e¢ ciency gains
generated by the merger in state 2 tend to reduce the loss in consumer surplus and to amplify
the gain in prots resulting from the merger. This intuition is conrmed in the special case,
examined in the Appendix, in which rms compete à la Cournot and face a linear demand
function. In that case, straightforward computations show indeed that
CS1
1
>
CS2
2
implying that the competition authority should be more lenient in state 2.
This nding is at odds with the failing rm defense story (adapted to the ex ante view
taken in this note). Indeed, it implies that the competition authority should be more lenient
with an entrant that turns out to be particularly e¢ cient (more precisely, an entrant that is
more e¢ cient than the incumbent). In other words, in this scenario, the competition authority
should prefer to increase the reward of an entrant in case it is successful (i.e. e¢ cient) rather
than reduce its loss in case it is unsuccessful (i.e. ine¢ cient).
5 Conclusion
We build a simple model to examine the optimal design of merger policy when competition
authorities maximize consumer surplus taking into account the e¤ect of their policy on entry.
Focusing on the treatment of mergers that are anticompetitive ex post (i.e. after entry occurs),
we show that the ratio between the loss in consumer surplus and the gain in an entrants prot
induced by the merger is a key determinant of the optimal policy. More specically, this ratio is
a su¢ cient statistic that determines when competition authorities should be the most lenient.
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Our analysis extends to a more general problem than the one considered in this note: it
applies to any situation in which a public authority seeks to induce an investment benecial
to consumers by using an instrument that results in losses in consumer surplus ex post. In
particular, they are relevant for the optimal use of patent policy to encourage R&D investments
when there is uncertainty about the state of the world that prevails once the innovation is
achieved.
6 References
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990), "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 80, 107-126.
Gowrisankaran (1999), "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers," RAND Journal
of Economics, 30, 56-83.
Igami, M. and K. Uetake (2016), "Mergers, Innovation and Entry-Exit Dynamics: The Con-
solidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1996-2015," Working Paper.
McAfee, R.P. and M. A. Williams, "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy," The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 40, 181-187.
Mason, R. and H. Weeds (2013), "Merger Policy, Entry, and Entrepreneurship", European
Economic Review, 57, 23-38.
Nocke, V. and M. Whinston (2010), "Dynamic Merger Review," The Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 118, 1201-1251.
Salant, S., Switzer, S. and R. Reynolds (1983), "Losses Due to a Merger: The E¤ects of an
Exogenous Shock in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 98, 185-199.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote 1 = 1 and 2 = (1  ) 2. Since it is optimal for the competition authority
to induce entry, its maximization program can be rewritten as the following (constrained)
minimization program
min
(1;2)2[0;][0;1 ]
1CS1 + 2CS2
s.t. 11 + 22 = F   ~F (0; 0)
where we use the (previously made) observation that the constraint is necessarily binding at
the optimum. Plugging the value of 2 given by the constraint into the objective function
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yields the following unidimensional minimization program
min
12[0;]
1CS1 +
F  ~F (0;0) 11
2
CS2
s.t. F 
~F (0;0) 11
2
2 [0; 1  ]
which can be rewritten as
min
1
1

CS1   12CS2

s.t. 1 2
h
max

0; F 
~F (0;0) (1 )2
1

;min

; F 
~F (0;0)
1
i
If CS1=1 > CS2=2 then CS1   12CS2 > 0 and, therefore, the solution to this
program is 1 = max

0; F 
~F (0;0) (1 )2
1

, which implies that the optimal value of 2 is
2 = min

F  ~F (0;0)
2
; (1  )

. This, combined with the observation that F 
~F (0;0) (1 )2
1
=
1  ~F (1;1) F1 leads to the result in this scenario. The result in the caseCS1=1 < CS2=2
can then be derived by symmetry. Finally, in the limiting case CS1=1 = CS2=2, all
the pairs (1; 2) that satisfy the (binding) constraint are solutions to the program.
Proof of Proposition 2
Denoting g = G0 the density function of the entry cost, and omitting the arguments of ~F ,
we have
@ECS
@1
=
@ ~F
@1
g( ~F )


 
CSC1   1CS1   CSm1

+ (1  )  CSC2   2CS2   CSm2 
 G( ~F )CS1
= 1G( ~F )
 g
G
( ~F )[
 
CSC1   1CS1   CSm1

+(1  )  CSC2   2CS2   CSm2 ]  CS11

:
Thus, @ECS@1 = 0 if and only if
g
G
( ~F )


 
CSC1   1CS1   CSm1

+ (1  )  CSC2   2CS2   CSm2  = CS11 ; (3)
and similarly @ECS@2 = 0 if and only if
g
G
( ~F )


 
CSC1   1CS1   CSm1

+ (1  )  CSC2   2CS2   CSm2  = CS22 : (4)
Since the left-hand sides of (3) and (4) are the same, it follows that the solution (1; 2) to the
competition authoritys maximization program cannot be such that 0 < 1 < 1 and 0 < 2 < 1
unless CS1=1 = CS2=2: More specically, if CS1=1 < CS2=2 then the only
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three possible scenarios are the following: 1 = 2 = 0; 1 > 0 and 2 = 0; 1 = 1 and 2 > 0.
The possible outcomes in the case CS1=1 > CS2=2 can be obtained by symmetry.
Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2: Cournot competition with linear demand
Assume that the incumbent and the entrant compete à la Cournot (if they do not merge)
and that the demand function is given by D(p) = 1  p:
Scenario 1:
Assume that c^1 = c^2 = c = 0 and c1 = c > c2 = 0, where c < 1=2. Note rst that, in
this setting, condition (2) is satised if 0 < c < 2=5 and is not satised if 2=5  c < 1=2.
Straightforward computations yield
m (0) =
1
4
; CSm (0) =
1
8
; C (0; c) =
(1 + c)2
9
; C (c; 0) =
(1  2c)2
9
; CSC(0; c) =
(2  c)2
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which implies that
CS1
1
=
1
72
 
7  16c+ 4c2
1
72 (1 + 8c  20c2)
=
 
c  12

(4c  14)

 
c  12

( 2  20c) =
7  2c
 (1 + 10c)
The latter is decreasing in c, which implies that its is less than its value for c = 0, which is
equal to CS22 . Thus,
CS1
1
<
CS2
2
:
Scenario 2:
Assume that c^1 = c^2 = c > 0 and c1 = c > c2 = c = 0, where c < 1=2. In that case,
m (c) =
(1  c)2
4
; C (c; c) =
(1  c)2
9
;CSC(c; c) =
2
9
(1  c)2 ; CSm (c) = (1  c)
2
8
which yields CS11 =
7
 : Moreover, we can derive from our computations in scenario 1 that
CS2
2
= 7 2c(1+10c) , which is decreasing in c and therefore less than 7. Thus,
CS1
1
>
CS2
2
:
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